Nothing to Hide
posted by:David Matheson // 12:52 PM // May 20, 2005 // Core Concepts: language and labels
To be apathetic about protecting one's privacy typically involves the belief that one has no reason to protect one's privacy. And, as Teresa Scassa points out in her recent ID Trail Mix post, one common ground of this belief comes out in expressions of the "nothing to hide" attitude. But what is the idea behind this attitude, exactly, and how is it supposed to warrant the apathetic belief?
It seems to me that when someone says "I'm not concerned about my privacy; I've got nothing to hide" they are typically offering up one or the other of two basic arguments. I'll call the first the "Licit Behavior Argument" and the second the "No Desire Argument". My aim here is to explain why I think that neither argument is very good, and hence why I think that the "nothing to hide" attitude fails to serve as a decent basis for apathy about privacy protection.
1. The Licit Behavior Argument
The Licit Behavior Argument is pretty straightforward, and can be captured be the following simple syllogism:
Premise 1: My behavior is licit (i.e. not illegal or immoral in any serious way).
Premise 2: If my behavior is licit, then I have no reason to protect my privacy.
Conclusion: Therefore, I have no reason to protect my privacy.
I'm not myself inclined to challenge those who claim the likes of Premise 1 about themselves. In any case, trying to convince someone that she ought to be more concerned about protecting her privacy by trying to convince her that she's more wicked that she realizes strikes me as a strategy that's unlikely to succeed.
The real problem with the Licit Behavior Argument comes with Premise 2. It assumes that reasons to protect one's privacy are all disreputable, for it assumes that if one does have a reason for protection, then there must be some illicit activity that one would like to keep others from knowing about. But if the literature on privacy has brought anything clearly to light over the last 30 years or so, it's that there is a wealth of reasons for an individual to protect her privacy that have nothing to do with her engaging in illicit behavior. If --as is plausible-- the possession of privacy is a necessary condition on (or at any rate a very useful means to securing) differential social relations such as friendship and intimacy, on individual autonomy, and on excellence in the political arena, then there are plenty of reasons to protect one's privacy (not to mention that of others) that are motivated by nothing but the most noble of goals.
2. The No Desire Argument
The other argument that may be offered in expressions of the "nothing to hide" attitude is unconcerned with (il)licit behavior. It simply points to the absence of desire on the part of the speaker when it comes to protecting her privacy. This No Desire Argument can also be captured quite simply:
Premise 1: I have no desire to protect my privacy.
Premise 2: If I have no desire to protect my privacy, then I have no reason to protect my privacy.
Conclusion: Therefore, I have no reason to protect my privacy.
I suspect that most people who reason in this way are quite right when it comes to the first step, Premise 1: they simply don't have a burning desire to protect their privacy, and could care less about the whole business. And even if we admit (as I think we should) that people can occasionally be quite wrong about what they really desire, I think in most cases these individuals will nonetheless be a better position than I to say whether they have the relevant desire.
But that still leaves Premise 2. On the face of things, it looks like this second step of the No Desire Argument is trivially true. Doesn't it just make the obvious point that if someone doesn't care about her privacy, then (no surprise!) she doesn't care about her privacy?
Well, no, it doesn't. And far from being trivially true, I think Premise 2 of the No Desire Argument is false for most people. Here's why. The consequent of that premise -- the bit that comes after the 'then' -- talks about having no reason to protect one's privacy. The antecedent of the premise -- the bit that comes after the 'if' -- talks about having no desire to protect one's privacy. So what Premise 2 of the Absent Desire Argument in effect says is this: No one can have a reason to protect her privacy unless she desires to protect it. (Others might have reasons for protecting their, or even her privacy, but she herself doesn't if she has no desire to.) But now consider the more general principle that underwrites this idea: No one can have a reason to perform an action unless she desires to perform that action. The falsity of this general principle is easily seen by thinking about the following case (modified from the original case discussed by the late British philosopher Bernard Williams in a famous paper entitled "Internal and External Reasons"). Suppose I love gin, and presently have a strong hankering for a taste of the stuff. There is, in fact, a full bottle of it right in front of me. Sadly, however, I don't take a sip, because I'm under the mistaken impression that the bottle contains lighter fluid. What should we say of this situation? I have no desire to drink from the bottle, due to my false belief about what it contains. That explains why I don't actually drink from the bottle. Nevertheless, I have a reason to drink from it, even if the reason is unknown to me: it would satisfy a desire for gin that I happen to have. (True enough, I would desire to drink from it if I were properly informed about its contents; but since I'm not in fact so informed, I don't in fact desire to drink from it.) So, generally, one can have a reason to perform an action despite having no desire to.
A similar point can now be made about Premise 2 of the No Desire Argument. Due to ignorance about the nature or consequences of protecting one's privacy -- e.g. a failure to understand how important privacy, and hence its protection, is for securing such goods as friendship, intimacy, autonomy, political excellence, etc. -- one can in fact have a reason to protect one's privacy despite having no desire to protect if. If one's ignorance were removed, one would have the desire, given that one desires these other goods; and that suffices to give one a reason for protecting one's privacy in the absence of any actual desire to do so.
